NNNNPTTUZYUW RUTLAAA0980 3572147-UUUU--RUDOMKA RUDOREB RUHJFBA.
ZNR UUUUU ZYN
P 232146Z DEC 82
FM FBIS WASHINGTON DC
TO RUDOMKA/FBIS LONDON UK
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REF LD230108 ON MOSCOW TV PASS-FEED SPEECHES

- 1. I THINK LONDON HAS JUST DROPPED THE OTHER SHOE WE HAVE BEEN WAITING FOR IN THIS MURKY BUSINESS OF SATELLITE SOURCELINES. IT SEEMS A SAFE ASSUMPTION THAT THESE PARTICULAR SPEECHES ARE BEING TRANSMITTED TO THE RESPECTIVE REPUBLICS FOR FURTHER DISSEMINATION. BUT RATHER THAN TRY TO MAKE SUCH JUDGMENTS, WHERE EVIDENCE IS LACKING, WE THINK THE BEST SOLUTION IS TO USE A +POINT-TO-POINT+ SOURCELINE WHICH INDICATES THAT THE INTENDED RECIPIENT IS UNKNOWN. THUS, WE PREFER THE FOLLOWING: +MOSCOW TELEVISION IN RUSSIAN TO UNSPECIFIED RECIPIENTS.+ THE +UNSPECIFIED RECEIPIENTS+ FORUMULATION IS NOT WITHOUT PRECEDENT, HAVING BEEN USED IN THE PAST ON CERTAIN PRESS AGENCY TRANSMISSIONS. IF EITHER BEFORE, DURING, OR AFTER A TRANSMISSION YOU CAN DETERMINE THE INTENDED TARGET (E.G. LODON'S PAST INTERCEPT OF PASS-FEED TRANSMISSIONS FROM MOSCOW TO SOFIA AND BUDAPEST), OR CIRCUMSTANCES ARE SUCH THAT THE RECEIPIENT CAN BE DETERMINED WITHOUT SUCH IDENTIFICATION (E.G. THE FEEDS FROM TASHKENT TO MOSCOW), THEN THE TARGET SHOULD BE INCLUDED IN THE SOURCELINE, WHEN NO SUCH DETERMINATION CAN BE MADE, GO WITH THE +UNSPECIFIED RECIPIENTS.+ DO NOT INCLUDE +DOMESTIC+ IN THE SOURCELINE.
- 2. A COUPLE OF QUESTIONS REMAIN IN CONNECTION WITH THE SPEECHES REPORTED IN THE REF FYI. IN THE TWO INSTANCES WHERE YOU NOTE AUDIO ONLY, + WHAT WAS TRANSMITTED ON THE VIDEO? STILL PICTURES OR THE SPEAKERS, LOGO, TEST PATTERNS, OR WHAT? WE ASSUME THESE SPEECHES WERE TRANSMITTED ON THE SAME TRANSPONDER/FREQUENCY AS THE REGULAR FIRST PROGRAM.
- 3. AS NOTED IN EARLIER EXCHANGES, CONTINUE TO TREAT THESE PASS-FEED INTERCEPTS AS OFFICIAL USE ONLY. WP 23/2152Z DEC

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